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INTRODUCTION
ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.'
[E]very dollar provided in benefits is a dollar spent by . . . the employer; and
every dollar saved . .. is a dollar in [the employer's] pocket. 2
The healthcare reform effort culminating in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) has focused, to date, on the plight of the
uninsured and on barriers to insurance such as pre-existing condition exclusions.
Reform efforts focus less often, however, on threats to healthcare benefits for
people who do have health insurance. When insured individuals suffer a serious
illness, does their insurance live up to its promise? One overlooked threat to the
insured concerns administration of employer-sponsored health insurance plans.
Specifically, participants' benefits are threatened by the lack of consequences
when administrators of such plans improperly process claims for healthcare
benefits by delaying the decision, failing to conduct a complete review, or simply
denying the claim incorrectly.
For those covered by healthcare plans ("Participants"), a claim for benefits
occurs each time the plan Participant seeks to access benefits under the plan. A
Participant may seek benefits retrospectively or prospectively. In the case of a
retrospective claim, a Participant seeks medical care and then files a claim with
the plan, following the plan's prescribed process.4 The healthcare provider may
file the claim on the Participant's behalf if the Participant has assigned benefits to
the provider.5 The Participant then waits for the decision-maker6 to send the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law; J.D. 1999, The University of
Texas School of Law; B.A. 1991, University of Houston. I am grateful to Danyahel Norris and
R6gine Svre for their excellent research assistance. I thank Professors Cassandra L. Hill, Thomas
Kleven, Rebecca K. Stewart, and Tobi Tabor for reviewing drafts of this article and offering their
insightful comments. I thank Anne Traverse and Davor S. Vukadin for their insights and constant
support. This research was made possible by a summer research grant generously provided by
Thurgood Marshall School of Law.
1. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
2. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 112 (2008) (quoting Bruch v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987)).
3. Kanika Kapur, Carole Roan Gresenz & David M. Studdert, Managing Care: Utilization
Review in Action at Two Capitated Medical Groups, HEALTH AFF. 276 (June 18, 2003),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/06/1 8/hlthaff.w3.275.full.pdf
4. How to File a Claim for Your Benefits, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/how to file claim.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2011).
5. D. Brian Hufford, Managed Care Litigation: The Role of Providers, in HEALTH CARE
LITIGATION: WHAT You NEED To KNow AFTER PEGRAM 487, 501 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2000)
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required written notice of a decision, and if the claim is denied, the Participant
decides whether to appeal. When the Participant seeks benefits prospectively,
the Participant requests pre-authorization from the plan for the intended
treatment. Prospective denials can also be appealed, although a Participant faced
with a denial of pre-authorization must either go forward with the treatment or
await a decision on appeal.9
Employer-sponsored healthcare plans are governed by the Employee
Retirement Security Income Act of 1974 (ERISA).10 When Congress enacted
ERISA, healthcare and claim denials were less problematic. At that time, insurers
tended to pay claims after patients received treatment, without requiring pre-
approval, and deferred to the diagnoses and treatment decisions of healthcare
providers. Rising healthcare costs, however, prompted insurers to control costs
through utilization review12 and pre-certification. 13
In addition, increasing numbers of ERISA plans are self-funded.14 Under a
self-funded (also known as a self-insured) plan, an employer (or other plan
sponsor) pays the cost of claims directly, rather than purchasing insurance on an
employee's behalf.'5 Self-funded plans are not considered insurance roducts and
are therefore beyond the reach of many state insurance regulations. As a result,
these plans have avoided insurance reform at the state level. 17
communicate with and be paid directly by insurance companies for providing medical services.").
6. As discussed in Section L.A infra, the entity with decision-making power may be an
insurance company, a third-party administrator, or the employer itself.
7. Id.
8. Hufford, supra note 5, at 492.
9. See, e.g., Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 757 (D. Ariz. 1996) (explaining that a
denial of preauthorization often prevents receipt of treatment due to delay).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
11. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A
POLITICAL HISTORY 283 (2004).
12. Utilization review is the review of requested care to determine whether it is necessary,
particularly with a view to controlling costs. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2008), available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/utilization-review.
13. Precertification is "authorization for a specific medical procedure before it is done or for
admission to an institution for care." Elsevier, MOSBY'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2009),
available at http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/precertification.
14. In 2010, fifty-nine percent of covered workers were in a self-funded plan, up from forty-
four percent in 1999. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST,




17. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 284 (noting the "backlash" against ERISA's lack of remedies
and the increase in reform initiatives and noting that these reforms do not reach self-funded plans).
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ERISA's regulations set out the specifics of claims processing, including
guidelines that health insurance companies must follow when they establish
internal rules for claims processing. The regulations set time limits for deciding
claims and appeals, govern the content of notices to participants of claim denials
and rights to appeal, and require consistent decisions on similar types of claims.
These are largely procedural matters, but they affect the availability of benefits
directly. Most denied claims are never appealed-if a claim is decided
incorrectly or appeal rights are not conveyed, the incorrect denial simply stays
undisturbed.1
The current approach to claims regulation enforcement does not match the
importance of these procedures in the lives of plan participants. For example,
what is the consequence when a health insurance company does not abide by
these claims processing regulations? What if a health insurance company
improperly denies certain claims when they are initially filed, then pays those
claims if they are appealed, perhaps banking on many Participants becoming
discouraged and walking away without an appeal? What is the consequence if a
health insurance company improperly denies a significant claim, then pays it only
during litigation? As this Article will show, in each of these cases, the health
insurance company suffers little or no penalty for violating claims regulations.
And yet, the financial incentive to do so, thereby avoiding paying claims, is
19enormous.
For Participants, the consequences are significant. An incorrect retrospective
denial or underpayment results in either the Participant or the healthcare provider
absorbing the unpaid costs. 20 And if the Participant is unable to absorb the cost,
financial hardship or even medical bankruptcy may result.21 An incorrect
prospective denial may well mean that the participant is unable to access the
18. Caroline E. Mayer, The Claim Game, AARP THE MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 32
(quoting Connecticut's health care advocate Kevin Lembo as stating that ninety-six percent of
denials are not appealed); General Information on How To File Insurance Appeals, ADVOCACY FOR
PATIENTS WITH CHRONIC ILLNESS, INC., http://www.advocacyforpatients.org/hifile.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2011) (stating that ninety-four percent of denials are never appealed).
19. See discussion of financial incentives at infra Section I.A.
20. AM. MED. Ass'N, APPEAL THAT CLAIM (2008), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/368/appeal-that-claim.pdf (providing examples of physician
practices that routinely lose money because Payors underpay for treatments already provided);
Fawn Johnson, Big Health Firms Underpay Claims, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204621904574248061750721736.html (noting
that when Payors underpay claims, participants make up the difference; the amounts overpaid by
participants are difficult to estimate).
21. Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of Professor Elizabeth Warren, Harvard Law Professor) (noting that one million people
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necessary care. Such a denial may be life-threatening or even fatal.22
Physicians and other healthcare providers also suffer when healthcare claims
are improperly delayed or denied. Busy physician practices and other healthcare
providers must devote additional time and personnel to appeals and follow-up.23
And if providers do not follow up on improperly processed claims, they risk
losing si nificant amounts of money for services that were legitimately
provided.
This Article advocates a new framework for the enforcement of claims-
processing regulations. Under the current ap roach, most non-compliance is
excused under the "substantial compliance" doctrine, and even substantial
departures from the claims regulations generally result in no substantive
26remedy. This approach excuses practically all instances of regulatory non-
22. In one such case, a father of four sought inpatient treatment for alcoholism; such treatment
was expressly included as a term of his benefit plan. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F.
Supp. 49, 52 (D. Mass. 1997). The utilization review provider, however, "repeatedly and arbitrarily
denied" the treatment and refused to authorize it. Id. Lacking a private placement for treatment, a
court that had conducted a commitment hearing ordered him to treatment in a correctional facility,
where he received little treatment and was abused by other inmates. Id. at 51. The man died after
consuming a six-pack of beer three weeks after his release. Id at 52. In the subsequent lawsuit that
went "right to the heart of the benefit determination process," the court dismissed the surviving
spouse's wrongful death, breach of contract, and other claims, noting that ERISA provided no other
choice. Id at 53. The court referred to ERISA as a "legal Pac-Man" and noted that ERISA now
provides a "shield of near absolute immunity [that] cannot be justified." Id. at 63. The court
concluded that there was no legal choice but to "slam the courthouse doors in [the surviving
spouse's] face and leave her without any remedy." Id. at 53. In another case, a plan administrator's
delay in approving a bone marrow transplant procedure was alleged to have proven fatal, where
cancer metastasized to the patient's brain during the delay period, thereby disqualifying her from
having the bone marrow transplant. Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the "unfortunate consequence of the compromise Congress made in drafting ERISA"
left plaintiff without a remedy).
23. "[P]hysicians and practice staff should all participate in the audit process ... You might
also consider hiring a consultant who specializes in billing and collections to assist in specified
audit tasks." AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 20, at I1.
24. See id. at 8-9 (citing numerous examples of physician practices whose claims were being
underpaid, sometimes by as much as $100,000 per month).
25. The exact contours of the "substantial compliance" doctrine depend on the court applying
it and the particular circumstances of the case. Generally, however, "substantial compliance" is
understood to mean technical non-compliance with the claims regulations, such that the
regulation's purpose is nonetheless accomplished. See, e.g., Larson v. Old Dominion Freight Line,
Inc., 277 F. App'x 318, 321-22 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that even if the administrator's
communications did not technically comply with the regulations in that they did not give the basis
for the claim denial, they provided a sufficient understanding of the administrator's position and
therefore substantially complied).
26. See discussion of lack of incentives to comply infra Section II.B.
335
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compliance and places the enforcement burden on those least able to shoulder
it-the individuals seeking and paying for medical care. Instead, ERISA's goal
of ensuring contracted benefits would be better served if enforcement moved to a
presumed-harm approach, akin to the approach used in numerous consumer
finance laws. This Article argues that the same concerns driving consumer
financial protections have even greater force where healthcare is concerned.
Part I of this Article sets out the problem of improper claims processing and
provides background on ERISA and its regulations. Part II examines the claims
processing regulations and their current interpretation in the courts. Part III
explains the case for a presumed-harm approach to enforcement of the claims
processing regulations and suggests two remedies: First, non-compliance with
claims processing regulations should be penalized through an expanded view of
attorney's fee awards. Second, the Truth in Lending Act shows how ERISA
reform could adopt the presumed-harm approach and thereby lend predictability,
efficiency, and equity to the enforcement of ERISA's claims processing
regulations.
I. THE CLAIMS PROCESSING PROBLEM AND ERISA
ERISA was enacted in 1974 with pension plan reform in mind.27 At the
time, few imagined that ERISA would serve such a significant role with regard to
healthcare.28 Since 1974, increasing numbers of employers have redesigned their
employee benefit plans as ERISA plans, in order to take advantage of the limited
plaintiff remedies available under ERISA and ERISA's protection from state
regulation.29 Today, ERISA governs most of America's non-Medicare healthcare
coverage,30 and ERISA's regulations set the ground rules for processing
27. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 281.
28. Id.
29. In a notorious example of an insurance executive's frank assessment of ERISA's
advantages, the executive noted in a memo that
[t]he advantages of ERISA . . . are enormous: state law is preempted by federal
law, there are no jury trials, there are no compensatory or punitive damages,
relief is usually limited to the amount of benefit in question, and claims
administrators may receive a deferential standard of review. . . . [For a set of]
12 claim situations where we settled for $7.8 million in the aggregate . . . [i]f
these 12 cases had been covered by ERISA, our liability would have been
between zero and $0.5 million.
The memorandum goes on to note: "While our objective is to pay all valid claims and deny invalid
claims, there are gray areas, and ERISA applicability may influence our course of action."
Memorandum from Jeff McCall to IDC Mgmt. Grp. & Glenn Felton (Oct. 2, 1995), available at
http://www.erisa-claims.com/library/Provident%20memo.pdf.




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 11 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol11/iss2/3
DELAYED AND DENIED
healthcare claims. 31 As set out below, the ERISA statute's origins in reform and
access to benefits have grown into a complex thicket that leaves participating
employees and their beneficiaries with fewer remedies than they had before
ERISA's enactment.
A. The Problem: Why Claims Regulations Matter
As written, ERISA's claims processing regulations are intended to help
ensure accurate, prompt initial decisions on healthcare claims.32 The regulations
set out time frames for claims processing and procedures for appealing a denial.33
They require clear communication of Participants' rights.34 A violation of claims
regulations may result in an improper denial, or it may leave a Participant with
insufficient information about a denial or the Participant's right to appeal.
Whether or not the violation ultimately results in an improper denial, the effect is
that the Participant is denied information, rights, and, potentially, coverage to
which the Participant is entitled.
The regulations also allow the Participant to sue and have a federal judge
decide whether the claim should have been paid after a plan administrator
repeatedly denies a healthcare claim. But the vast majority of Participants whose
claims are denied do not sue. 35  In fact, most do not even appeal the claim
internally to a plan administrator. 36 Upon initial submission, healthcare claims
are denied at a rate of approximately one in seven, so that two hundred million of
the 1.4 billion claims submitted annually are initially denied.3 7 According to the
American Medical Association's most recent estimate, about twenty percent of
31. The regulations derive from 29 U.S.C. § 1133, which requires every employee benefit
plan, in accordance with regulations of the Department, to "provide adequate notice in writing to
[any] participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting
forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
participant," and to "afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has
been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying
the claim." 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2006).
32. The regulations require that plan procedures "contain administrative processes and
safeguards designed to ensure and to verify that benefit claim determinations are made in
accordance with governing plan documents and that, where appropriate, the plan provisions have
been applied consistently with respect to similarly situated claimants." 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
1(b)(5) (2009).
33. Id. § 2560.503-1(f), (h), (i).
34. Id. § 2560.503-l(c)(3)(iv).
35. In order to sue, participants must first exhaust their appeal rights within the plan. Id. §
2560.503-l (c)(3)(iii).
36. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
37. See Mayer supra note 18.
337
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all healthcare claims are processed incorrectly.38 More than ninety percent of
claim denials, according to most estimates, are never appealed. 39 Of the denials
that are appealed, about half are reversed in favor of the Participant.40
Even though so many denied claims are never appealed, health insurance
companies are not penalized when claims are denied upon initial submission and
paid only upon first or second appeal.41 Even a procedural violation, such as a
failure to communicate appeal rights, may be excused if the error is cured at
some later point.42 This regulatory approach provides no remedy for the many
Participants that drop out of the appeals process at the first miscommunication.
At the same time, health insurance companies and employers offering self-
insured plans (together, "Payors") profit enormously when claims are denied or
otherwise diminished.43 Empirical research links higher net profits with an
increased tendency to discount or deny claims.44 Therefore, Payors, whether
38. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n., National Health Insurer Report Card (June 14, 2010),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your
-practice/coding-billing-insurance/heal-claims-process/national-health-insurer-report-card.shtml
(reporting that approximately twenty percent of claims are processed incorrectly and advocating a
uniform, national set of standards for processing healthcare claims); see also Press Release, Cal.
Nurses Ass'n/Nat'l Nurses Org. Comm., California's Real Death Panels: Insurers Deny 21% of
Claims (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.calnurses.org/media-center/press-releases/2009/
september/california-s-real-death-panels-insurers-deny-21-of-claims.html (estimating the denial
rate at twenty-one percent and quoting the organization's co-president Deborah Burger, stating
"[t]he routine denial of care by private insurers is like the elephant in the room no one in the
present national healthcare debate seems to want to talk about").
39. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 18, at 32.
40. Walecia Konrad, Fighting Denied Claims Requires Perseverance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2010, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/health/06patient.html.
41. Occasionally, courts raise the argument that reputational concerns weigh against the
significant financial incentives favoring aggressive claim denials. As leading ERISA scholar John
Langbein notes, most potential employees accept the health insurance benefits available when they
accept a particular job, and potential employees are unlikely to inquire about other employees'
healthcare claims experience before accepting a job. John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory
Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1315, 1328 (2007).
42. Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term Disability Plan, 493 F.3d 533, 539-40
(5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a plan's substantial regulatory compliance in the final level of appeal
cured the non-compliance in the first two levels, in that the initial telephone contact in place of the
required written notice, and the subsequent inadequate written notice, were cured by a subsequent
compliant written notice at the first level of review).
43. Jeffrey D. Greenberg et al., Reimbursement Denial and Reversal by Health Plans at a
University Hospital, 117 J. AM. MED. 629, 633 (2004) (finding a "strong positive correlation"
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administering plans or directing others to do so, have a strong incentive to act
against Participants' interests.45
Whether plans are fully insured or self-insured, incorrect denials amount to
enhanced profit for the would-be Payor. In the case of fully insured plans, the
decision-maker and Payor are the same entity, such that money saved on
participants' medical care equates to greater amounts of money available for
salaries, administrative expenses, and profits.46 Accordingly, courts recognize the
conflict that arises when the same entity both determines benefit eligibility and
pays benefits. 47
In the case of self-funded plans, the financial conflict analysis is different,
because claims processing is generally handled by a third-party administrator
(TPA), at least with regard to initial claims decisions.48 There is, however, no
prohibition against an employer's administering claims in-house, and some larger
employers may choose to do so if they have the necessary personnel and
resources to assess claims.49 Employers may rely on a TPA for utilization review
as well. Where a TPA processes claims for the ultimate Payor-the employer-
the conflict of interest may be less direct than if the ultimate Payor determines
eligibility and then pays claims directly out of its own pocket.
But a Payor's delegation of some day-to-day plan operations to a TPA,
which serves at the pleasure of the Payor, does not necessarily neutralize the
conflict. While the conflict may be somewhat attenuated when the Payor does not
also act as the decision-maker, the Payor may still have a hand in the process in
several ways: through the terms of its relationship with the TPA, through
45. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. 2003) ("ERISA's remedial
scheme gives HMOs every incentive to act in their own and not in their beneficiaries' interest while
simultaneously making it incredibly difficult for plan participants to pursue what meager remedies
they possess, a confounding result for a statute whose original purpose was to protect employees.").
46. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSURANCE COMPANIES PROSPER, FAMILIES
SUFFER, available at http://nchc.org/sites/default/files/resources/insuranceprofits.pdf (last visited
Feb. 16, 2011) (noting that three of the top five insurers spent less on participant medical care,
while spending more on "salaries, administrative expenses, and profits").
47. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 112 (2008) (noting that the payor's fiduciary
interest "may counsel in favor of granting a borderline claim while its immediate financial interest
counsels to the contrary"). Thus, the payor has an interest "conflicting with that of the
beneficiaries." Id.
48. Understanding Your Fiduciary Responsibilties Under a Group Health Plan, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR (Oct. 2008), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/ghpfiduciaryresponsibilities.html
("Employers often hire outside professionals (sometimes called third-party service providers) ... to
manage some or all of the plan's day-to-day operations.").
49. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE ADM'RS AsS'N, http://www.hcaa.org/selffunding.htm (last visited




Vukadin: Delayed and Denied
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
influence over the TPA, or through retention of control over appealed claims.50
As one court explained, "delegation of claims administration does not negate a
structural conflict outright."51 Although the Payor delegates claims responsibili1
to the TPA, the Payor may still influence the TPA's decision-making process.
For example, in one case where the employer had delegated the decision as to
whether benefits should be provided, the court found evidence that the employer
still retained some oversight of the process and gave financial incentives to the
TPA if the plan was administered as the employer wished.5 3 Thus, Payors retain
control of the claims process, to varying degrees ranging from some control to
considerable control, despite delegation to a TPA. 54
Correct initial processing of claims is particularly important because plan
administrators' decisions are given deference by the courts under ERISA. In
1989, the Court decided that where plan terms give the plan administrator
discretion to determine benefit eligibility and interpret plan terms, plan
administrators' decisions should be given deference unless the decisions are
arbitrary and capricious. Each circuit court of appeals articulates and applies
the arbitrary and capricious standard slightly differently, but a decision is
typically considered arbitrary and capricious if there was no reasonable basis for
the decision.56 If the determination is one of medical necessity, for example, a
plan administrator must take treating physicians' opinions into account, but is
free to disagree with treating physicians if the plan reviewers find other evidence
more compelling.57  This deferential standard applies even if the plan
50. See, e.g., Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland v. Emerson Elec. Co., 202 F.3d 839, 844 (6th Cir.
2000) (noting that even where a TPA makes the initial claims decision, a conflict may still exist if
appeals are decided by a board appointed by the payor/employer). The court "should be particularly
vigilant in situations where, as here, the plan sponsor bears all or most of the risk of paying claims,
and also appoints the body designated as the final arbiter of such claims. Under these
circumstances, the potential for self-interested decision-making is evident." Id.
51. Leu v. Cox Long-Term Disability Plan, No. 2:08-CV-00889-PHX-JAT, 2009 WL
2219288, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 24, 2009).
52. Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a TPA
merely made recommendations regarding benefit eligibility to the plan administrator while the
administrator made final decisions), rev'don other grounds, 538 U.S. 822 (2003).
53. Mazur v. Pac. Telesis Grp. Comprehensive Disability Benefits Plan, No. C07-01904 JSW
2008 WL 564796 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008).
54. Williams v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1135-37 (1Ith Cir. 2004) (finding
that an employer had delegated claims processing to a TPA but still influenced the claims process).
55. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989).
56. See, e.g., Gannon v. Metro. Life Ins., 360 F.3d 211, 213 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that
evidence is substantial if it "is reasonably sufficient to support a conclusion, and the existence of
contrary evidence does not, in itself, make the administrator's decision arbitrary").
57. See, e.g., Love v. Dell, Inc., 551 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2008) (reviewing plan
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administrator both decides and pays claims, as many do.5 8 In such situations,
there is a perfect dollar-for-dollar conflict every time a claim is granted: "[E]very
dollar provided in benefits is a dollar spent by ... the employer; and every dollar
saved . .. is a dollar in [the employer's] pocket."5 9 And, as explained above, even
if the plan administrator is a separate entity from the Payor, the Payor generally
selects and hires the plan administrator and may well retain direct or indirect
control over claims processing, such that the conflict remains. If the plan does
not grant discretion to the administrator to determine benefit eligibility and
60
interpret plan terms, then the decision must be reviewed de novo. In a de novo
review, the court does not defer to the plan administrator's decision, but instead
interprets the plan and reviews the evidence itself in order to decide the claim for
benefits.61 However, the Court is increasingly narrowing the circumstances under
which de novo review is available, and the Court recently reaffirmed its approval
of the abuse of discretion standard and noted its disapproval of ad hoc exceptions
to deferential review.62 Because of this deference and because so few Participants
pursue their rights to appeal and sue, the accuracy of the initial claims decision
and the communication of the Participants' rights are critically important in
. 63
achieving ERISA's goal of ensuring contracted benefits.
B. ERISA's Purpose and Background
The ERISA claims processing reulations derive from the larger ERISA
scheme that was enacted in 1974. Congress enacted ERISA to protect
Participants' interests in employer-sponsored benefit 6 lans by setting out
regulations and providing access to the federal courts. In enacting ERISA,
a seventeen-year-old's intensive inpatient treatment for serious mental illness and substance abuse
was not medically necessary, despite treating physicians' opinion that it was).
58. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 120 (2008) (noting that the conflict-of-
interest concern applies to the "lion's share" of ERISA benefit denial cases).
59. Id at 112.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 112-13.
62. Id
63. HEALTH, EDUC. & HUM. SERVS. Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-276104,
EMPLOYER-BASED MANAGED CARE PLANS: ERISA's EFFECT ON REMEDIES FOR BENEFIT DENIALS
AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 25-30 (1998) (noting that the Department of Labor and others favor
stronger remedies for non-compliance with the claims process, so that "upstream" compliance is
improved).
64. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006)).
65. Id. § 1001 ("The Congress finds . .. that the continued well-being and security of millions
of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; . . . it is therefore desirable
in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries . . . that minimum standards be provided
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Congress addressed two main risks to pension plans: the risk of default and the
risk of poor administration. 6 ERISA contains rules that are specific to pension
plans, as well as rules that apply to both pension plans and welfare benefit plans,
such as healthcare plans.67 While pension plans are vulnerable to default or
insolvency risk, welfare benefit plans are exposed to the risk of poor
administration in the same way as pension plans.68 For this reason, Congress
brought welfare plans under ERISA's umbrella, so that ERISA's fiduciary rules
would apply. 69
C. Basis in Trust Law
In developing ERISA, Congress did not create a new legal approach, but
instead imported trust law as ERISA's framework. 70 ERISA sets out fiduciary
duties applicable to the administration of plans,71 including the rules of loyalty
and prudence and the exclusive benefit rule.72 Instead of setting out all of the
specific powers of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress imported the common
law of trusts to describe the responsibilities of ERISA fiduciaries.7 3
assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness. . . . It is hereby
declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce and the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . ."); Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila,
542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004); Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982)
("Congress enacted ERISA to protect working men and women from abuses in the administration
and investment of private retirement plans and employee welfare plans.").
66. John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1322-23 (2003) (explaining
that the movement that led to the passage of ERISA "effectively commenced in 1963, when the
financially troubled automaker, Studebaker, defaulted on its pension plan, frustrating the support
expectations of several thousand workers and retirees").
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (stating that the term "employee welfare benefit plan" includes
medical, accident, disability, death, unemployment, child care, training, scholarship, prepaid legal,
and vacation benefit plans).
68. Langbein, supra note 66, at 1323.
69. Id.
70. Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) ("ERISA abounds with the
language and terminology of trust law" and stating that ERISA's legislative history shows that
principles of trust law were meant to apply to ERISA fiduciaries); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4651 ("The principles of fiduciary conduct are
adopted from existing trust law, but with modifications appropriate for employee benefit plans.");
Langbein, supra note 66, at 1319 ("Congress made a deliberate choice to subject these plans to the
pre-existing regime of trust law rather than to invent a new regulatory structure.").
71. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
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Under ERISA, those who exercise discretion over management of the plan
or who are named as fiduciaries in the plan are subject to fiduciary duties, and so
is any person exercising material discretion over plan assets or administration.74
This means that the individuals who make healthcare benefit decisions are acting
as fiduciaries and are bound by these duties; ERISA's legislative history supports
the imposition of fiduciary duties upon those who make claims determinations
and pay plan benefits. 75
ERISA fiduciaries must discharge their duties with respect to the plan
"solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. . . ."76 Fiduciaries are
also required to carry out their duties "in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the plan[.]"n
The traditional trustee "is not permitted to place himself in a position where
it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries." 78 Under
ERISA, however, a trustee can be in exactly that position, having financial
interests directly opposed to plan Participants. An ERISA fiduciary can be in
the position of making healthcare claims determinations that, if decided against
the beneficiary, would place additional funds in the fiduciary's employer's
pocket to the beneficiary's detriment. 80
ERISA, therefore, imports trust law but ignores one of trust law's most
important principles-the principle that plan fiduciaries should not breach their
duties to beneficiaries and, certainly, should not be in a position to benefit
financially from breaching those duties. Given these diametrically opposed
interests and the profit-earning goals of Payors, additional incentives to comply
with claims processing regulations are needed, as set out below.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); Langbein, supra note 66, at 1324-25.
75. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 301 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5081 (discussing procedures for delegating fiduciary duties, such as
"allocation or delegation of duties with respect to payment of benefits"); 120 CONG. REC. 29,929
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (stating that ERISA imposes "strict fiduciary obligations upon
those who exercise management or control over the assets or administration of an employee
pension or welfare plan . . . .").
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1).
77. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
78. Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000) (quoting IIA WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, ScOTT
ON TRUSTS § 170 (4th ed. 1998)).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 120 (2008) (Roberts, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the conflict-of-interest concern applies to most
ERISA benefit denial cases).
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D. Preemption and Enforcement
ERISA preempts all state laws that "relate to" ERISA plans, as well as any
cause of action that duplicates or supplants a claim under ERISA's enforcement
- - 81provisions. ERISA thus takes away most state-law claims and remedies, but
courts struggle with what, if anything, ERISA provides in their place. Indeed, the
preemption provision often takes away state-law claims but gives no replacement
claim at all.82 ERISA's preemption provision was always intended to be broad. 83
But, Congress also intended that ERISA would be supplemented by a federal
common law, developed in the federal courts and tailored to ERISA and its
purposes. 84 As explained below in Subsection II.B.4, no such remedial, tailored
federal common law has emerged.
The remedies available under ERISA are notoriously limited, heightening
the need for plan administrators to determine initial claims and appeals
accurately. ERISA typically provides little relief when administrators violate
claims regulations by, for example, failing to give adequate notice about appeals
or reviewing a claim improperly, even though these violations often leave
legitimate claims unpaid.
ERISA contains an integrated civil enforcement scheme consisting of the six
provisions found in section 1132(a2 of the statute; these are the exclusive means
of enforcing ERISA's provisions. ERISA's enforcement provisions have taken
on particular importance because ERISA takes away other traditional state law
causes of action and remedies. A wronged Participant cannot sue immediately
81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1144.
82. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he result
ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans have no remedy, state or federal, for what
may have been a serious mistake."); see also WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 283-84 (discussing the
limited remedies available to plan participants).
83. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 282.
84. Upon presenting the Conference Report to the full Senate, principal sponsor Senator Javits
stated, "It is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to
deal with issues concerning rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." 120
CONG. REc. 29, 942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing Congress's intention that the courts
would develop a federal common law of ERISA).
85. See, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring) ("[V]irtually all state law remedies are preempted [by ERISA] but very few federal
substitutes are provided.").
86. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55 (1986)).
87. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 55 ("The deliberate care with which ERISA's
civil enforcement remedies were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of
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in federal court but must first exhaust administrative remedies within the plan.88
Faced with a claim denial, a Participant must first appeal according to a
plan's internal procedures. An internal appeal generally results in appealing a
claim once or twice within the health insurance company or third-party
administrator's system.89 After exhausting these administrative remedies, the
Participant is then eligible to file an ERISA lawsuit in federal court. Under the
basic claim for benefits, a participant brings a cause of action under ERISA
section 501(a)(1), for "benefits due." This provision permits recovery of the
benefit's value. ERISA contains an attorney's fee provision permitting the award
of attorney's fees to either party, within the court's discretion. 90
ERISA provides that plaintiffs can recover equitable relief under certain
circumstances.91 Despite careful and convincing scholarship to the contrary, the
Supreme Court does not include a make-whole remedy within those remedies. 92
Thus, if the Participant wins the lawsuit, the Participant is generally awarded the
value of the benefit and nothing more.93 Under current Supreme Court authority,
to be exclusive."). This exchange of traditional remedies for ERISA remedies has come to be
known as the "ERISA bargain"-the idea that in exchange for security in benefits, employees gave
up their traditional state-law remedies. The "ERISA bargain" is recognized by courts and is
frequently cited when the intersection between ERISA's broad preemption provision and the lack
of any equivalent federal remedy results in harms without remedies:
Plaintiffs and employees similarly situated receive the many protections of
ERISA in exchange for certain rights to sue under previous federal and state
law. Congress has decided that they are better off for the bargain. Whatever
injustices this scheme may tolerate in isolated instances are more than
compensated by the general security provided to pension rights under ERISA-
plaintiffs themselves are now enjoying the fruits of rights which Caterpillar
could not and cannot divest. If workers deserve further protection, it will be up
to Congress to provide it.
Willams v. Caterpillar, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 148, 152 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
88. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg, & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 259 (2008).
89. In some circumstances, Participants can also submit denied claims for independent,
external review. Karen Politz et al., Assessing State External Review Programs and the Effects of
Pending Federal Patients' Rights Legislation, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Revised May 2002),
http://www.kff.org/insurance/externalreviewpart2rev.pdf On average, external reviews overturn
forty-five percent of denials submitted to them. Id. at v-vi. External reviews are, however,
complicated to access and underused; in New York, for example, only 902 consumers filed for
external review in the reporting year ending in June 2000, although 8.4 million consumers are
covered by the external review law in that state. Id.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2006).
91. Id § I 132(a)(3)(B).
92. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 282.
93. See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (permitting no
extra-contractual damages for delayed processing of claim).
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ERISA does not contemplate extra-contractual damages for consequential harms,
even when the result is that the Participant is not made whole.94 The Participant
might also receive attorney's fees at the court's discretion. 95
Thus, if a claim is improperly denied, and the Participant appeals within the
plan, pursues a federal lawsuit and wins, the Participant stands to gain only the
value of the benefit that was denied. Attorney's fees may be awarded, but are not
presumed. The current lack of consequential and punitive damages means that
the improper denial is typically not separately and distinctly penalized at all.
Because of these features of the ERISA regime, the accuracy and completeness
of the initial claims review is doubly important and should be incentivized
accordingly.
II. A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WITH LITTLE INCENTIVE TO COMPLY
As currently interpreted, the regulations that govern claims processing do
not contain incentives to comply with any precision. Unless the regulatory
violation results in serious, direct harm, noncompliance is generally excused
under the "substantial compliance" doctrine set out below. Even where
noncompliance is substantial, ERISA provides no substantive remedy. In most
cases, even after a Participant has sued in federal court, the plan administrator is
not penalized but is simply instructed to go back and take the action that it should
have taken in the first instance.
A. The Regulatory Background
Department of Labor (DOL) regulations set out a framework of minimum
standards for processing healthcare benefit claims.96 ERISA authorizes these
regulations and provides that every employee benefit plan shall give adequate
notice of a claim denial and afford a reasonable opportunity for a full review of
denied claims. 97 Participants must exhaust these internal processes before filing
suit in federal court, but the internal claims and appeal processes are deemed
exhausted in the absence of strict compliance with the claims regulations. 98
The PPACA added new requirements for internal claims review and appeal
94. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
96. Most of the regulations apply to claims for healthcare benefits but also to claims for
benefits under other types of ERISA plans. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 220 (2004)
("These regulations, on their face, apply equally to health benefit plans and other plans, and do not
draw distinctions between medical and nonmedical benefits determinations.").
97. 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
98. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(F) (2010) (providing that where a plan fails to
establish or follow claims procedures consistent with the regulation's requirement, a claimant shall
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processes, as well as external review. 99 The new regulations apply to employee
benefit plans (and other types of group health plans) for plan years beginning
September 23, 2010.100 The regulations do not apply to "grandfathered" plans,
that is, plans that were in effect before the enactment of the PPACA that have not
been significantly altered in terms of coverage or benefits.o10
Under the regulations, plan administrators have an obligation to maintain
reasonable claims procedures.102 Claims procedures are defined as unreasonable
if they contain any provision unduly inhibiting the processing of claims, such as
requiring a person to receive prior authorization when the person is unconscious
or requiring that a person pay a fee to appeal a claim denial.103 Procedures must
contain "administrative processes and safeguards" designed to ensure that plan
provisions are interpreted and aplied consistently, and that decisions are made
according to plan documents.'o Claims for benefits must be processed within
thirty days after the plan's receipt of the claim, unless the plan administrator
determines that a fifteen-day extension is necessary and sends written notice of
the extension. os The statute does not require Payors to pay interest on late-paid
claims.
If a claim is denied, a written denial must set out the basis for the denial,
reference the specific plan provision upon which the decision was based, and
give a description of any additional material or information needed to pursue the
claim.106 If an internal rule, guideline, protocol, or similar criterion was relied
upon in the denial, that rule or criterion must be disclosed to the claimant upon
request.107 In addition, the notice must be written "in a manner calculated to be
99. The PPACA (along with the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA))
created authority for additional internal and external claims and appeals to be issued jointly by the
Department of Treasury's Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor's Employee Benefits
Security Administration (EBSA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These
agencies published their interim final rules with a request for comments on July 23, 2010. The
interim final regulations are published at 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T (2010) (IRS), 29 C.F.R. §
2590.715-2719 (EBSA), and 45 C.F.R. § 147.136 (HHS). Citations herein will be to the EBSA
version of the regulations.
100. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(d).
101. Id. § 2590.715-1251(c); see also Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health
Insurance Issuers Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,332 (July 23, 2010).
102. 29 C.F.R § 2560.503-1(b).
103. Id. § 2560.503-1(b)(3).
104. Id § 2560.503-l(b)(5).
105. Id. § 2560.503-1(f)(2)(iii)(B).
106. Id § 2560.503-1(g)(1).
107. Id. § 2560.503-1(g)(v)(A), (j)(5)(i); see also FAQs About the Benefit Claims Procedure
Regulation, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_claimsproc_reg.html (last
visited April 12, 2011). ("The [D]epartment [of Labor] also has taken the position that internal
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understood by the claimant." 08 The notice must also contain appropriate
information as to the steps required if the Participant wishes to submit the claim
for review. 109 When benefits are denied, the plan must afford the Participant the
opportunity for a full and fair review.110
The new regulations expand the definition of adverse benefit determination
to include a coverage rescission (a cancellation or discontinuance of coverage),
such that rescissions of coverage are subject to internal review just as any other
adverse benefit determination would be.'I' Notably, the regulations revise the
conflict-of-interest rules so that compensation of claims-processing personnel
cannot be directly tied to the proportion of claims denied. 12 All of these new
regulations amount to progress for the plan Participant-but the lack of
compliance still results in no direct, substantive remedy. The new regulations
also expand the availability of external review of denied healthcare claims. Plans
and issuers not presently subject to a state external review process will be subject
to a federal process. 1 The preamble to the regulations explains that ERISA
preemption prevents a state external review process from applying to most self-
insured lans and that these plans are now subject to the federal external review
process. 14 An external review process, however, represents yet another step that
Participants must take in order to reverse an improperly denied claim.
To fully protect Participants, many of whom will never follow up on denied
claims, Payors must be incentivized to comply with the regulations by accurately
processing and properly approving claims in the first place.
B. Little Incentive To Comply
While the regulations set out specific requirements for claims processing,
rules, guidelines, protocols, or similar criteria would constitute instruments under which a plan is
established or operated within the meaning of section 104(b)(4) of ERISA and, as such, must be
disclosed to participants and beneficiaries.").
108. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g).
109. Under the regulations applicable to this section, the denial notice must contain: (1) the
specific reason or reasons for the denial; (2) specific reference to the pertinent plan provisions on
which the denial is based; (3) a description of any additional material or information necessary for
claimant to perfect the claim and an explanation of why such information is necessary; and (4)
appropriate information as to the steps to be taken if the participant or beneficiary wishes to submit
his or her claim for review. Id.
110. Id. § 2560.503-1(h).
111. Id. § 2590.715-2719(a)(2)(i).
112. Id. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(D).
113. Id. § 2590.715-2719(d).
114. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and
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Participants have little recourse when plan administrators do not comply. Many
violations are excused through the generous "substantial compliance" doctrine;
more serious or continuing process violations are often conflated with the claim
denial at issue and rarely result in an independent, substantive remedy. Only the
most flagrant violations provoke a targeted judicial response, and even then, the
remedy is almost always procedural rather than substantive. ls The claim may be
returned to the plan administrator for processing in compliance with the plan
terms and ERISA regulations, but the Participant receives no compensation for
the delay or for the time and effort devoted to appealing the claim and filing a
lawsuit.
The regulations as currently interpreted provide little incentive to reject the
following strategic approaches to payment of healthcare claims:
*Denying a claim incorrectly upon initial filing, then, if the
Participant appeals, paying the claim upon first-level internal
appeal. ERISA regulations do not provide for any penalty in this
situation; moreover, attorney's fees are not available during the
administrative phase."'6 This approach would reduce the number
of claims ultimately paid, because a high percentage of
Participants do not appeal.' 17
*Denying certain types of claims incorrectly upon initialfiling, then
paying them during litigation. This approach results in
practically no penalty at all to the plan administrator, unless the
plaintiff persists in the litigation and is awarded attorney's
fees.' 1 Again, this approach would reduce the number of claims
paid, because a high percentage of Participants do not appeal.
*Paying claims outside the regulatory deadlines. Any single instance
of delayed payment is likely to be excused within the
"substantial compliance" doctrine."19
115. See, e.g., Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term Disability Plan, 493 F.3d
533, 540 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[F]ailure to fulfill procedural requirements generally does not give rise
to a substantive damage remedy." (quoting Hines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 211 (5th
Cir. 1995))).
116. See, e.g., Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir.
2004) ("We join the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in holding that term 'any action' in
29 U.S.C. § 132(g)(1) does not extend to pre-litigation administrative proceedings.").
117. As set out in Section IA, an estimated ninety percent of denied claims are not appealed.
118. See, e.g., Schoedinger v. United Healthcare, No. 4:04-cv-664 SNL, 2006 WL 3803935
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2006) (awarding fees where Payor paid some claims during litigation).
119. See infra Subsection I.B.l. If a Payor does not have reasonable claims procedures
consistent with the regulation, the Participant may elect to proceed directly to federal court. 29
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(1). Given the low percentages of denied claims that are appealed, however,
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*Failing to communicate the basis for the claim denial or the
Participant's right to appeal. If such a failure comes to light as
part of a claims denial, the omission is likely to be excused under
the "substantial compliance" doctrine. 120 If the Participant suffers
consequential harm due to lack of disclosure, consequential
damages are unavailable under current ERISA law. 12 1
As described below, these strategies and other kinds of non-compliance are
insufficiently addressed by the current regulations and ERISA's enforcement
regime. Indeed, ERISA, as currently interpreted, effectively invites such strategic
approaches to claims processing.
1. The "Substantial Compliance" Doctrine Sets the Bar Low
When Participants progress through the internal appeals process and on to
federal court, the court first determines whether the non-compliance was
substantial and whether the administrator complied with the regulations' purpose.
In the case of non-substantial violations, courts apply the judicially created
"substantial compliance" doctrine, which excuses many instances of non-
compliance. This doctrine relaxes the technical requirements, excusing non-
compliance so long as a "meaningful dialogue" between plan administrator and
Participant takes place. Depending on the particular court's analysis, the
"substantial compliance" doctrine has thepotential to excuse strict compliance or
compliance with multiple regulations. A Payor can, for example, delay a
decision on the claim beyond the regulatory deadlines and still be within
120. See infra Section I.B.
121. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
122. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 41, at 1318-33 (detailing the Unum/Provident bad-faith
denial scandal and explaining the dangers of plan administrators both deciding and paying claims).
123. See, e.g., Robinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 443 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2006)
("Challenges to ERISA procedures are evaluated under the substantial compliance standard.");
Lacy v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P. Long Term Disability Plan, 405 F.3d 254, 256-57 (5th Cir.
2005) (holding that where a notice of denial of benefits did not strictly comply with DOL
Regulations, it was sufficient to trigger appeal deadlines and only substantial rather than strict
compliance with ERISA § 1133 and DOL Regulation § 2560.503-1(f) was required).
124. See, e.g., Larson v. Old Dominion Frieght Line Inc., 277 F. App'x 318, 321 (4th Cir.
2008) (holding that even if the Administrator's communications did not technically comply with
the regulations in that they did not give the basis for the claim denial, they provided a sufficient
understanding of the Administrator's position and therefore substantially complied); Wade v.
Hewlett Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term Disability Plan, 493 F.3d 533, 539-40 (5th Cir. 2007)
(excusing multiple failures to comply with claims regulations under the substantial compliance
doctrine, when the administrator's oral rather than written notice did not comply, a subsequent
denial letter did not list the plan criteria or reasons for denial, and it did not specify what
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"substantial compliance" so long as information is still being exchanged with the
125Participant.
In addition, non-compliance with the regulations at initial levels of appeal
may be excused if the plan administrator's acts during a subsequent level of
appeal effectively cure the initial non-compliance.126 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reasoned that this approach is in keeping with the regulations' goal of
encouraging a meaningful dialogue rather than any particular technical
compliance. 2 Significantly, however, this ability to later "cure" any earlier
regulatory non-compliance essentially gives companies a second chance to
comply, negating the importance of strict initial compliance.
2. Substantial Noncompliance Results in Remand Rather Than a
Substantive Remedy
Even significant regulatory violations rarely trigger a substantive remedy.128
Remand to the plan administrator for a full and fair review is the most common
remedy for substantial regulatory noncompliance.129 But the regulatory violation
itself usually makes little substantive difference to the outcome, because the
regulatory violation tends to be conflated with the accompanying improper denial
of benefits. 130 Indeed, there is no clear agreement as to whether regulatory non-
125. Gilbertson v. Allied Signal Inc., 328 F.3d 625, 634-35 (10th Cir. 2003).
126. Wade, 493 F.3d at 540 (holding that a plan's substantial regulatory compliance in the
final level of appeal cured the non-compliance in the first two levels; i.e., initial telephone contact
in place of a required written notice was cured by a subsequent written notice).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Lafleur v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 563 F.3d 148, 157 (5th Cir. 2009)
("[F]ailure to fulfill procedural requirements generally does not give rise to a substantive damage
remedy." (quoting Wade 493 F.3d at 540)); Hines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 211
(5th Cir. 1995) (finding no violation where an employer failed to notify an employee of a change in
his health insurance policy); Duncan v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:03-CV-
1931N, 2005 WL 331116, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2005) ("Procedural violations of ERISA do not
entitle the plan beneficiary to a substantive remedy unless the beneficiary can prove continuous
violations resulting in some prejudice to the beneficiary.").
129. See Lafleur, 563 F.3d at 157 (explaining that remand is typically appropriate and
preferable to substantive remedy).
130. Where, for example, an administrator changed the basis for its denial of disability
benefits and failed to identify its vocational expert as specifically required by the regulations, the
Fifth Circuit found that defendant, Aetna Life Insurance Company, had violated the claims
regulations in a manner that constituted "more than mere technical noncompliance." Robinson v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 443 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542
U.S. 200, 220 (2004) (noting that the regulations "apply equally to health benefit plans and other
plans, and do not draw a distinction between medical and nonmedical benefits determinations").
But despite this clear violation, the court imposed no remedy to address this violation as beyond the
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compliance can independently result in a remedy at all. 131
Without any such remedy, administrators perpetuating the vast majority of
claims regulations violations tend to suffer no effects other than to be instructed
to do what they should have done in the first place. For example, an administrator
who fails to provide the full and fair review of a claim as required by ERISA is
frequently ordered to go back and conduct the same full and fair review that it
should originally have conducted.132 Likewise, although the claims regulations
clearly set out deadlines for making claims decisions, in case after case,
administrators suffer no consequence from ignoring the regulations. Instead, the
courts most often simply instruct the administrator to approve the initially denied
claim, providing the administrator more time in which to do so.133
When a claim decision is delayed beyond the regulatory deadlines, there is
no penalty except that the claim is "deemed denied" so that the Participant can
immediately seek relief in the federal courts. 134 Even where claims on internal
award of benefits that would have resulted anyway. See Robinson, 443 F.3d at 397. The court
maintained the abuse of discretion standard of review, slightly modified due to the Payor's dual
role as administrator and insurer. Id. at 395. The court entered judgment for the Participant, based
on the fact that there was no evidence in the record to support the defendant's decision. Id. at 395.
The regulatory violation, therefore, did not alter the outcome that would have occurred without the
violation.
131. The Fifth Circuit has discussed, but not directly addressed, whether the court would
entertain a remedy for a breach of the regulations or whether there was in fact any legal basis for
such a remedy. Custer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 503 F.3d 415, 422 n.5 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e
make no holding on the difficult question of what remedy, if any, ERISA provides for a violation of
its reporting and disclosure requirements.").
132. See, e.g., Smith v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 450 F.3d 253, 265 (6th Cir. 2006) (remanding for the
entry of an order that the Plan Administrator reconsider the plaintiffs disability claim where the
Plan Administrator had failed to conduct a full and fair review, thus abusing its discretion, in the
first instance); Weaver v. Phx. Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1993)
("Normally, where the plan administrator has failed to comply with ERISA's procedural guidelines
and the plaintiff/participant has preserved his objection to the plan administrator's noncompliance,
the proper course of action for the court is remand to the plan administrator for a 'full and fair
review."'); VanderKlok v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 956 F.2d 610, 616-17 (6th Cir.
1992) (holding that the Plan Administrator failed to comply with section 1133, reversing and
remanding the benefits decision for a full and fair review); Duncan, 2005 WL 331116, at *4
(ordering the plan administrator to reconsider the plaintiffs administrative appeal where the plan
administrator had failed to conduct a full and fair review, thus abusing its discretion, in the first
instance); Hamilton v. Mecca, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1540, 1552 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
133. Nave v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., No. C.A. 98-3960, 1999 WL 238949, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 30, 1999) (holding that where insurer had failed to make its decision within the regulatory
deadline and had given no notice of any special circumstances requiring an extension the insurer
had "neither strictly nor substantially complied" with section 2560.503-1(h) the equitable result
was to dismiss plaintiffs lawsuit and give Payor another fourteen days to make its decision).
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appeal are deemed denied due to administrator inaction, thereby forcing
Participants to go to federal court to even receive a decision on the benefit claim,
the deferential standard of review applied to the majority of initial denials is
generally left intact.135 Thus, the Participant, who may have been forced to seek
relief in federal court in order to receive a decision on a relatively small dollar
amount, can still be denied that relief.
3. The Most Flagrant Violations Do Not Result in a Substantive Remedy
Even the most serious and continuing violations of ERISA claims
regulations rarely result in a substantive remedy.136 The "paradigmatic example"
of this most serious type of violation is the Blau case, in which "the defendants
failed to comply with virtually every applicable mandate of ERISA."1 37 In that
case, participants were denied benefits under a welfare plan.138 Upon litigation of
the denial, the court found that the claims procedure did not exist in any
recognizable form: "[T]here was no summary plan description, no claims
procedure, and no provision to inform participants in writing of anything. [The]
claims procedure fail[ed] simply because there was none." 39 The court noted
that where procedural violations are so extreme, they "alter the very balance of
knowledge and rights between covered employees and their employer."14 0
For extreme cases such as these, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, for
example, contemplates a substantive remedy-in the form of a retroactive
treated as being denied after the regulatory deadlines pass, enabling the claimant to bring a civil
action to have the claim's merits determined by the court); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(4)
(2010) (governing regulatory deadlines).
135. Gilbertson v. Allied Signal Inc., 328 F.3d 625 (10th Cir. 2003). But see Jebian v.
Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee Benefits Organization Income Protection Plan, 349 F.3d 1098 (9th
Cir. 2002) (applying de novo standard where internal appeal was not decided within applicable
deadline).
136. See, e.g., Lafleur v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 563 F.3d 148, 157 (5th Cir. 2009)
(noting that substantive damages for a flagrant regulatory violation could include retroactive
reinstatement of benefits but that the court "ha[s] not fully identified the scope of available
remedies" for procedural violations); Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 971 (9th
Cir. 2006) (holding that the most flagrant disregard for claims regulations can result in de novo
review of the plan administrator's decision; citing no possibility of a substantive remedy); Bard v.
Bos. Shipping Ass'n, 471 F.3d 229, 244 (1st Cir. 2006) (striking evidence and awarding benefits
based on remaining evidence where procedural violations were "serious, had a connection to the
substantive decision reached, and call[ed] into question the integrity of the benefits-denial decision
itself').
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reinstatement of benefits-but has not yet seen cause to impose it. 14 1
A severe procedural violation can result in the denial decision being treated
with less deference, lowering the standard of review and leading the courts to
conduct a de novo review of the administrator's denial of benefits.142 The
reasoning is that by ignoring the claims procedures, the administrator has
essentially failed to exercise its contractually accorded discretion, such that there
is no exercise of discretion for the court to review.143 The administrator may also
have violated the procedures mandated by ERISA in a way that is "so flagrant as
to alter the substantive relationship between the employer and employee, thereby
causing the beneficiary substantive harm."1 44 The altered standard of review does
not of course necessarily result in any award of benefits or any other remedy: if a
de novo review does not uncover any error in the denial of benefits, the denial
remains intact and no remedy is given.
Even this relatively slight remedy may be in doubt. In a recent opinion, the
Supreme Court suggested that an administrator's failure to abide by fiduciary
duties should not result in a de novo standard of review. 145 The Court examined
the effect of the conflict of interest resulting from an insurer acting as the plan
administrator, and whether that dual role should imply a lowering of the standard
of review from abuse of discretion to de novo.146 The Court held that the abuse
of discretion standard should remain intact, but that the administrator's conflict
of interest should be a factor in determining whether the administrator abused its
discretion in denying the claim.147 Given this adherence to the abuse of discretion
standard in the case of a conflict of interest, the Court could accordingly find that
a procedural violation should likewise be a part of the review, rather than a
reason to alter the standard. 148
141. Lafleur, 563 F.3d at 157 (noting that substantive damages for a flagrant regulatory
violation could include retroactive reinstatement of benefits, but that the court "[has] not fully
identified the scope of available remedies" for procedural violations).
142. See Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 971 (9th Cir. 2006) ("When an
administrator engages in wholesale and flagrant violations of the procedural requirements of
ERISA, and these acts in utter disregard of the underlying purpose of the plan as well, we review de
novo the administrator's decision to deny benefits."). Contra Lafleur, 563 F.3d at 159 ("[W]e have
never definitively rejected the availability of this remedy, [but] we have previously refused to apply
it.").
143. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 972.
144. Duvall v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1202 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(quoting Gatti v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2005)).
145. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 115-16 (2008).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 108.
148. See, e.g., Duvall v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198 (E.D.
Cal. 2009) (suggesting that Glenn, 554 U.S. at 128, abrogated the proposed lowering of the
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In a small minority of cases, courts have viewed a violation of the claim
processing regulations alone as an abuse of discretion that could justify an award
of benefits. But in these cases, the violation of regulations still did not result in a
substantive remedy, because in each case the benefits should have been awarded
on the merits anyway. Thus, the defendant again does not suffer any independent
penalty for failing to follow the claims regulations, because the benefits should
have been awarded in the first place. 149
Where, for example, a defendant disability insurance company failed to
obtain the X-rays that it should have obtained to properly assess plaintiffs claim,
the court entered judgment for the plaintiff and cited its intention to create a
deterrent effect towards other insurers. 150 The court did not use the plan's failure
to obtain information as a means of lowering the applicable standard of review.
Instead, it applied the abuse of discretion standard and found that the defendant
had abused its discretion by failing to provide a full and fair review.151 The court
noted, however, that the plaintiff was in fact disabled, meaning that the effect of
the court's decision was simply that the administrator was forced to do what it
should have done in the first instance.152
4. Freestanding Claims for Breach ofFiduciary Duty Fail To Address
Regulatory Non-compliance
Section 1132(A)(3)(b) of ERISA is a "catch-all" provision that gives
Participants a potential cause of action for breaches of fiduciary duty such as
regulatory non-compliance; injunctive and other equitable remedies are
149. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that plan administrator's failure to obtain records from child's second and third hospitalization
amounted to abuse of plan administrator's discretion and awarding benefits and attorney's fees to
Participant). In this case, the treating physicians agreed that the Participant's hospitalization was
medically necessary, while the physicians reviewing the claim for the plan said that the
hospitalization was not medically necessary. Id. The reviewing physicians had neither examined the
Participant nor obtained records regarding two of the three hospitalizations. The court noted that
these records would have shown that the hospitalizations were medically necessary. Id.
150. Beauvais v. Citizens Fin. Group Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 22, 33 (D.RJ. 2006). The court's
judgment included an award of past and future disability benefits (because the disability was
supported by medical evidence), medical benefits under a plan for which the defendant had been
found ineligible due to her lack of disability status, and attorney's fees. The court expressed
disapproval of the insurer's actions and awarded attorney's fees and reinstated plaintiff's medical
benefits. In awarding attorney's fees, the court noted that such a remedy would serve as a deterrent
to other plan administrators inclined to deny benefits based on a failure to produce records they
never requested, "a deterrent that will benefit all plan participants." Id. at 33.
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available. 153 But this cause of action is not an easy fit to remedy regulatory non-
compliance, and, in addition, this provision's interpretation has proven extremely
complex-a "virtual legal labyrinth."1 54
The "catch-all" provision provides an avenue to remedy breaches of plan
terms and regulations. This section gives Participants the right to bring a civil
action "(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title
or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms
of the plan."155 This section is described as a "safety net, offering appropriate
equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that other recourse available
under ERISA does not adequately remedy."1 56 Under this provision, Participants
may sue breaching fiduciaries for traditionally available equitable remedies. 7
Any person exercising "material discretion" over plan assets or
administration is subject to fiduciary duties. 158 Thus, individuals who make
healthcare benefit decisions such as claims determinations are acting as
fiduciaries and are bound by these duties. 159 Each time an administrator fails to
comply with the regulations, it breaches its fiduciary duties. 160
Significantly, a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action does not require loss by
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006).
154. Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox ofEquitable Relief 39 J. MAR. L. REV.
827, 829 (2006).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
156. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996).
157. Calhoon v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Beneficiaries
of ERISA plans may sue for breaches of fiduciary duties under 20 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), but the
remedies they seek in such an action are limited by the language of the statute to traditionally
available equitable remedies.").
158. Langbein, supra note 66, at 1324-25.
159. See, e.g., Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 409 F.3d 710, 717 (6th Cir.
2005) (noting that parties with authority to grant or deny claims are ERISA fiduciaries); Libbey-
Owens-Ford Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut., 902 F.2d 1031, 1035 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding
that discretionary authority over claims triggered fiduciary status); H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 301
(1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5081 (discussing procedures for
delegating fiduciary duties, such as "allocation or delegation of duties with respect to payment of
benefits"); 120 CONG. REc. 29,929 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (stating that ERISA imposes
"strict fiduciary obligations upon those who exercise management or control over the assets or
administration of an employee pension or welfare plan").
160. See, e.g., John Blair Comm., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan, 26 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding the failure to comply with certain governing
ERISA sections and the applicable Treasury regulations thereunder amounted to a breach of
fiduciary duty); Larsen v. NMU Pension Plan Trust, 767 F. Supp. 554, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
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the plaintiff; gain by the defendant is sufficient.161 That is, if a defendant "has
made a profit through the violation of a duty to the plaintiff to whom he is in a
fiduciary relation, he can be compelled to surrender the profit to the plaintiff
although the profit was not made at the expense of the plaintiff."'162 The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for example, has obtained relief in
the form of equitable accounting for profits against defendants violating the
securities laws.
The fiduciary duty cause of action and equitable relief, however, have
proven inadequate to address ERISA refulatory non-compliance effectively.
Claims for equitable accounting for profits have met with some success under
limited circumstances-for example, a fiduciary that improperly withholds
161. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum, 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ("The plaintiffs case was
established when the defendants' duty and its breach were proved. This was done by showing that
the defendants were officers and directors of Western and that they disposed of the bulk of the
corporate assets to an outsider, for their own benefit . . . . The remedy follows, which, in this case,
is an accounting to ascertain and restore . . . the profits, if any."). Whether or not trust law includes
a make-whole remedy for ERISA plaintiffs is the subject of considerable scholarly debate and
judicial comment. For complete analysis of this issue, see Langbein, supra note 66, at 1333.
However, the disgorgement remedy sidesteps this debate, because disgorgement is not intended to
benefit the wronged beneficiary, but to prevent the unjust enrichment of the fiduciary. See Parke v.
First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1008-09 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the
equitable accounting and unjust enrichment disgorgement remedies fit within those traditionally
available in equity).
162. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160(d), at 646 (1937); see also Langbein, supra note 66,
at 1333 ("An aggrieved trust beneficiary ... may recover (1) for loss incurred, (2) for any profits
that the trustee made in breach of trust, and (3) for any gains that would have accrued but for the
breach.").
163. Where, for example, a defendant was found to have aided and abetted in primary
violations of books and records, net capital, and reporting violations of the federal securities laws,
the defendant was ordered to disgorge the profits earned by those wrongs, including commissions
paid to the defendant and markups on securities. SEC v. Solow, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1363 (S.D.
Fla. 2008). In such cases, the calculation need not be done with complete certainty. SEC v. Patel,
61 F.3d 137, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that plaintiff need only establish "a reasonable
approximation of profits causally connected to the violation" to establish the amount owed); Solow,
554 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. Indeed, in analogous situations under the securities laws, once a
reasonable approximation of the amount of unjust enrichment is established, the burden then shifts
to the defendant to show that the approximation is unreasonable. Solow, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
The risk of uncertainty in calculating the remedy falls on the defendant, whose illegal actions
created the uncertainty. Id.
164. Accounting for profits is "a restitutionary remedy based upon avoiding unjust
enrichment. In this sense, it reaches monies owed by a fiduciary or other wrongdoer, including
profits produced by property which in equity and good conscience belonged to the plaintiff."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4,3(5), at
408 (2d ed. 1993)).
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benefits can be held liable for interest on the withheld money on an unjust
enrichment theory.165 But while the "catch-all" provision cause of action is an
avenue against a plan administrator or ultimate payor's unjust enrichment
through improper claims processing, this cause of action is difficult to prove and
often unfruitful.166 Any individual instance of non-compliance (such as a failure
to communicate appeal rights or the basis for a denial) does not result in
significant unjust enrichment to the defendant beyond the amount of the denied
claim. In addition, this cause of action does not capture the most significant
unjust enrichment of defendants resulting from regulatory non-compliance: The
cost savings where claims are improperly denied and not appealed. The unjust
enrichment of Payors is more difficult to quantify in an ERISA breach of
fiduciary duty claim than in other areas of the law, such as securities law, in
which the wrongdoing more often results in a greater single, traceable profit.
Empirical research has found a correlation between higher Payor denial rates
and profits.167 And under trust law, the benefits gained in breach of a trust are
subject to equitable disgorgement. When the denials conflict with the terms of
ERISA plans and the Payors' or plan administrators' fiduciary duties to
Participants, the unpaid monies should be recoverable, not as compensation to
Participants, but as equitable disgorgement due to unjust enrichment.
Here again, trust law proves inadequate to address the particular needs of
ERISA plans, because its application has led only to confusing and uncertain
results. ERISA's legislative history makes clear that the courts are expected to
develop the federal common law of ERISA to develop the "appropriate equitable
relief' set out in 1132(a)(3)(B) and other areas of ERISA that were not
explicitly drawn.16 But this section has not led to any clear remedies, and
uncertainty still exists as to exactly what relief this provision can provide.
Where a single cause of action is too minimal to bring alone, but the wrong
being addressed appears to occur pervasively, the class action mechanism may
165. Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1005-09, (8th Cir. 2004)
("[A]n award of interest on wrongfully delayed benefits remains permissible ... as a remedy for a
breach of fiduciary duty to a beneficiary."); Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 214 F.R.D. 125, 134-
35 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that interest on wrongfully withheld benefits is available under ERISA
because it fits within the relief "typically available in equity").
166. See, e.g., Knieriem v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 434 F.3d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 2006)
(dismissing action under 29 U.S.C. § II 32(a)(3)(B) for accounting for profits for alleged wrongful
benefits denial).
167. Greenberg et al., supra note 43, at 633 (finding a "strong positive correlation" between
net profit margin and the adjusted odds that the plan would discount the cost of a day's stay in the
hospital).
168. Senator Jacob Javits, for example, is often cited as noting that the federal courts were to
develop "a body of Federal substantive law ... to deal with issues involving rights and obligations




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 11 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol11/iss2/3
DELAYED AND DENIED
provide an avenue for recovery. But class actions have not been a panacea for
ERISA non-compliance. Participant classes frequently founder on requirements
such as commonality of legal and factual issues, and the causal link between the
alleged wrongdoing and resulting damages can be too remote.
For example, where proposed Participant classes have brought lawsuits for
interest on denied or delayed claims, courts have found that individualized
analysis is required and class action treatment is unsuitable.169 That is, unless the
class meets the requirements under the Federal Rules of Procedure to be brought
as a class action, all the parties must be joined and the lawsuit cannot go forward
as a class action.170 Some narrowly drawn classes seeking injunctive relief for
specific, plan-wide improper treatment of claims are permitted to go forward.171
But in order for the class of Participants to have a significant chance of
certification, the class must be carefully drawn, the remedy sought must be
distinct from the claim for benefits, and the equitable remedy must be traceable
to the alleged harm.172 The class action vehicle is therefore an uncertain and
ungainly tool against most instances of regulatory non-compliance.
Thus, regulatory non-compliance in the processing of healthcare claims for
the most part results in no remedy at all. The most flagrant examples may result
in a procedural action such as remand for further review, but regulatory non-
compliance for the most part leads to no substantive remedy. Given the
deferential standard of review applied to plan administrators' decisions and the
169. See, e.g., Miner v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 2001 WL 96524 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
2001) (holding that claims for interest on delayed benefit payments may not be brought as a class
action); Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 307, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Holmes v.
Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. Civ. A 98-CV-1241, 1999 WL 554591, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
June 30, 1999), aff'd, 213 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[C]ourts are still required to make individual
assessments of each claim, examine the individual facts behind each claim, balance the equities,
and determine that a benefit payment was improperly delayed.").
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all class members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.").
171. See, e.g., Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 409 F.3d 710, 718 (6th Cir.
2005) (reversing dismissal of fiduciary-duty claims). The court wrote, "Only injunctive relief of the
type available under § 132(a)(3) will provide the complete relief sought by Plaintiffs by requiring
BCBSM to alter the manner in which it administers all the Programs' claims for emergency-
medical-treatment expenses." Id.
172. See, e.g., id.; Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1004 (8th Cir.
2004) (affirming denial of certification of putative Participant class seeking injunctive relief against
insurer's denial or suspension of disability benefits without evidence that disability no longer
existed; disability determination was too individual for class action).
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financial conflicts inherent in the process, the available remedies for regulatory
non-compliance are simply inadequate to protect Participants' access to their
promised benefits.
III. THE PRESUMED HARM APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT OF CLAIMS
PROCESSING REGULATIONS
If compliance with claims regulations is to be attractive, non-compliance
must be financially unattractive.173 Currently, financial incentives weigh heavily
in favor of non-compliance, because non-compliance generally results in no
substantive remedy. Two possible approaches to enforcement of claims
regulations would disincentivize non-compliance with claims processing
regulations. The discretionary attorney's fee remedy could be used more
aggressively to penalize regulatory non-compliance, as a minority of courts is
already doing. In the longer term, ERISA's enforcement provision and
regulations could explicitly adopt the presumed-harm approach of consumer
finance statutes.
A. Recognizing the Harm: Attorney's Fees as Deterrent to Regulatory Non-
compliance
Where a defendant fails to comply with claims regulations, some courts
award attorney's fees, even if the defendant cures the non-compliance during
litigation or the claim is remanded to the plan administrator for further review.
173. In Schoedinger v. United Healthcare, No. 4:04-cv-664 SNL, 2006 WL 3803935, at *8
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2006), the court awarded attorney's fees to a healthcare provider who had faced
repeated delays and denials of his claims. The court noted:
Whether it be purposeful or negligent, insurance companies regularly reduce
and deny claims without cause, thereby increasing the cost of healthcare to
providers and patients alike. If it became cost prohibitive for insurance
companies to engage in that behavior, it would incentivize more accurate
claims administration and processing in the future.
Id.
174. See, e.g., Mizzell v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 32 Fed. App'x 352, 355 (9th Cir.
2002) (affirming award of attorney's fees where court remanded to plan administrator for full and
fair review of denial); Finks v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No 08-1272 (ESH)(AK), 2009 WL
2230899, at *6 (D.D.C. July 24, 2009) (awarding attorney's fees where Payor paid claims during
litigation); Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 635 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D. Mass. 2009) (awarding fees
upon remand to plan administrator for review); Moskalski v. Bayer Corp., No. 2:06-cv-568, 2008
WL 2096892, at *1-2 (W.D. Pa. May 16, 2008) (awarding attorney's fees on remand to plan
administrator, where administrator's decision "lacked sufficient foundation" and court sought to
provided a financial incentive for Payors "to properly support [their] conclusions at the
administrative level"); Schoedinger, 2006 WL 3803935, at *7 (awarding attorney's fees where
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An award of attorney's fees acts as some deterrent to plan administrators who
would delay or deny claims improperly, and this approach can be more widely
adopted in order to encourage compliance with claims processing regulations.
In ERISA cases, courts have discretion to award attorney's fees to either
party.1 75 A court may award attorney's fees to either party if the party receives
"some degree of success on [the] merits."17 6 An award of ERISA attorney's fees
generally begins with analysis of the following factors:
(1) the degree of opposing parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) ability of
opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorneys' fees; (3) whether an award of
attorneys' fees against the opposing parties would deter other persons acting
under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting attorneys' fees
sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to
resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; and (5) the relative
177merits of the parties' positions.
The factors are not statutory, but are flexible guidelines that courts have used
to guide this discretionary analysis.17 8
When a court finds that a plan administrator has not complied with claims
regulations and the court remands the claim to the plan administrator, a plaintiff
may well receive no attorney's fee award.179 As courts address each of the five
attorney's fee factors, non-compliance with claims processing regulations often
does not amount to the "culpability or bad faith" addressed in the first attorney's
fee factor.so And, where claims processing is concerned, a deterrent effect on
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (2006) (providing that in any ERISA action "by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs
of action to either party").
176. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010) (citing Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)).
177. Id. (quoting Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1029 (4th Cir.
1993)).
178. Foltice v. Guardsman Prods., Inc., 98 F.3d 933, 937 (6th Cir. 1996).
179. See, e.g., Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir.
2007) (holding that attorney's fee issue was not ripe until after plan administrator's review on
remand); Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 161 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming
lower court's holding that defendant did not complete a proper vocational review and that denial of
disability benefits was arbitrary and capricious but reversing fee award because defendant's
decision was not "totally lacking in justification"); St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Carl Klemm, Inc., 459 F.
Supp. 2d 824, 834 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (denying motion for attorney's fees, based on the absence of
evidence that defendant was "simply out to harass" plan participant).
180. See, e.g., Kansas v. Titus, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1153 (D. Kan. 2006) (holding that
notification did not comply with claims regulations, but declining to find defendant "culpable" and
awarding no fees); Towner v. CIGNA Life Ins., 419 F. Supp. 2d 172, 186 (D. Conn. 2006) (finding
that defendant's claims processing did not comply with regulations, but finding no culpability and
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other defendants is not necessarily cited in weighing the attorney's fee factors.18 1
Moreover, in addressing the fourth factor, value to other plan participants, most
courts understand an ERISA claim dispute as an individual matter, such that the
lawsuit has no value to other participants.182
A few courts, however, are leading the way in a broader, more consumer-
oriented approach. These courts are using an award of attorney's fees to serve as
a disincentive to improperly process claims or deny or delay claims until a
lawsuit is filed.183 Broadening the usual constricted view of ERISA remedies,
these courts note the present disincentives to adhere to claims processing
procedures, and they award fees against plan administrators who refuse to follow
the claims processing regulations. 84 These courts look to the incentives created
awarding no fees). But see Perrin v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 06-182-JBC, 2008 WL 2705451, at
*3 (E.D. Ky. July 7, 2008) ("[D]efendant was highly culpable" based on "disregard for objective
medical evidence"); Elliott v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 04-174-DLB, 2007 WL 1558519, at *3
(E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007) (finding that defendant was culpable for purposes of fee award, based on
disregard of treating physicians and other factors in disability case); Plummer v. Hartford Life Ins.
Co., No. C-3-06-094, 2007 WL 838926 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2007) (finding defendant "at best,
highly culpable" due to its reliance on at least three flawed medical opinions and misstatements of
law and fact in litigation); Crider v. Highmark Life Ins. Co., No. 1:05-cv-660, 2006 WL 6157958,
at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2006) (finding defendant "highly culpable" without addressing
subjective state of mind, but based on "gross error" in terminating benefits).
181. St. Joseph's Hosp., 459 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (holding that plaintiff "was not provided an
opportunity for full and fair review" and awarding no attorney's fees); Towner, 419 F. Supp. 2d at
186 (D. Conn. 2006) (finding that defendant's claims processing did not comply with regulations
but finding no behavior that warranted deterrence and awarding no fees).
182. See, e.g, Foltice, 98 F.3d at 937 (finding that where the lawsuit created no common fund,
the fourth factor weighed in favor of defendant); McDonald v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., No.
C2-98-414, 2002 WL 484623, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that plaintiff sought his
own benefits and therefore did not confer any value on other participants).
183. One court explained succinctly the need for an attorney's fee deterrent against
mishandling of claims, particularly where the Payor both decides and funds claims:
[Tihere is evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the insurance
company engaged in a campaign of evaluation and re-evaluation of plaintiffs
claim, in a single-minded effort to document reasons for denial. From a purely
economic point of view, this is rational behavior. From a fiduciary point of view,
it is not. If the only consequence of an arbitrary denial of benefits is the chance
of being sued and a possibility of reinstatement of benefits at some future date,
insurance companies with this strong conflict of interest will have little incentive
to adhere to their fiduciary obligations.
Crider v. Highmark Life Ins. Co., 1:05-cv-660, 2006 WL 6157958, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 21,
2006) (awarding attorney's fees against defendant that arbitrarily terminated benefits).
184. Crider, 2006 WL 6157958, at *3; see also Beauvais v. Citizens Fin. Group Inc., 418 F.
Supp. 2d 22, 33 (D.R.I. 2006) (awarding attorney's fees where defendant discontinued benefits
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by the lack of ERISA remedies and the comparatively small number of benefit
regulation violations that are actually brought to court. As one such court
observed:
[A]n award of attorney's fees . . . is an important deterrent measure: first,
because of the limited remedy available to ERISA plaintiffs . . . insurers should
be dissuaded from prematurely suspending benefits with the hope that some
claimants will not sue; and second, because an award of attorney's fees ensures
that attorneys continue to take on ERISA cases in which the potential monetary
award may be limited.185
These courts analyze the ERISA attorney's fee factors differently and with
ERISA's overall context in mind. Confronted directly with plan administrators'
recalcitrance, or even a cavalier attitude toward ERISA regulations, the
consumer-oriented courts are finding fee awards appropriate under a broader
view of the five factors. 186
In one such case, a plan administrator denied a long-term disability claim
until the Participant filed suit. 187 During the course of the litigation, the
administrator paid the claim. The Participant pressed the lawsuit, and the court
awarded interest on the disability benefits and then analyzed the factors
v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 2d 206, 219 (D. Me. 2004) (citing defendant's "low level of
care to avoid improper denial of claims, at great human expense").
185. Giroux v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 45, 54 (D. Me. 2005) (quoting Black
v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 2d 206, 219 (D. Me. 2004)); see also Curtin v. Unum Life Ins.
Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 149, 159 (D. Me. 2004) (awarding attorney's fees where defendant took
insufficient care to avoid improper claim denials and noting the "limited remedies available under
ERISA for plaintiffs such as [plaintiff] Ms. Curtin").
186. See, e.g., Perrin v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 06-182-JBC, 2008 WL 2705451, at *4
(E.D. Ky. July 7, 2008) (awarding fees in order to deter other defendants from mishandling claims);
Becker v. Weinberg Grp., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2008) ("If [defendants] understood
that clearly erroneous actions taken by them . . . would be subject to attorneys' fees, that might well
deter them from engaging in such conduct."); Elliott v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 04-174-DLB,
2007 WL 1558519, at *3 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007) ("[T]here is also something to be said for the
heightened deterrent effect resulting from a fee award. Companies would likely take a much closer
look at denial decisions, and the presentation of that decision, if forced to take into account the
possibility that fees will be awarded upon remand."); Risteen v. Youth for Understanding, Inc., No.
Civ.A. 02-0709(JDB), 2003 WL 22011766, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2003) ("Awarding attorney's
fees to [Plaintiff] will provide future employers added incentive to comply with ERISA . . .
regulations, and encourage employers to resolve such disputes sooner rather than later, before
attorney's fees mount.").
187. Finks v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 08-1272 (ESH)(AK), 2009 WL 2230899, at *6-8
(D.D.C. July 24, 2009) (awarding attorney's fees where Payor paid claims during litigation).
188. Id. at *1.
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governing attorney's fee awards under a broad, remedial lens. In considering
the deterrent effect of a fee award, the court noted case law explaining that an
attorney's fee award should deter violations of ERISA as well as unnecessary
prolongation or unjust resolution of claims.190 The court also noted the plan
administrator's "cavalier attitude" toward ERISA's regulatory deadlines.191
While many courts still interpret ERISA's damage provisions narrowly, the
broader view of ERISA attorney's fees for regulatory violations appears to be
gaining ground in the face of the scant remedies otherwise available.1 The
attorney's fee solution is, however, far from a panacea. Attorney's fees are not
available for administrative action without litigation, so the availability of
attorney's fees is no detriment at all to administrators who would refuse to pay
claims initially and then pay on appeal or settle the claim as soon as litigation is
initiated.193 Furthermore, while more consistent fee awards may act as some
deterrent to non-compliance with claims regulations, the attorney's fee provision
remains discretionary and therefore uncertain. The attorney's fee provision of
ERISA amounts to some financial disincentive against ignoring claims
processing regulations. But given the minute percentage of denied claims that
proceed through the internal appeal and litigation processes to final judgment, the
189. Finks, 2009 WL 2230899.
190. Id. at *2 (citing Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 201, 206 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
191. Id. at *4 (noting with disapproval Payor's insistence that it had not backdated documents
so as to appear to be in compliance with regulatory deadlines, because it had no incentive to do
so-violation of the regulatory deadline would likely have no effect on Payor anyway). In addition,
the court considered the benefit that this lawsuit would confer on others. The court found that the
plaintiffs ability to enforce the terms of an insurance contract and perhaps dissuade insurance
companies from denying benefits until a lawsuit is filed was a benefit to other plan participants and
therefore a factor in the analysis. Instead of weighing in favor of the defendant as in the usual case,
this factor, the court found, weighed equally in favor of the plaintiff and defendant. Id. at *5.
192. See, e.g., Gatlin v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 16 F. App'x 283, 290 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[A]
stiffer penalty encourages plan administrators to alter their behavior with respect to employee
appeals ... ); Perrin v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 06-182-JBC, 2008 WL 2705451, at *4 (E.D.
Ky. July 7, 2008) ("[T]he defendant will take a closer look at the administrative record and its
denial decisions if it is faced with more than the prospect of merely reinstating benefits."); Elliott v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 04-174-DLB, 2007 WL 1558519, at *3 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007)
("Companies would likely take a much closer look at denial decisions, and the presentation of that
decision, if forced to take into account the possibility that fees will be awarded."); Powell v.
Premier Mfg. Support Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 01-05-0012, 2006 WL 1529470, at *10 (M.D. Tenn.
June 1, 2006) ("A fee award serves as a deterrent to conclusory statements that are devoid of
specific and fact-supported reasons for denial of benefits.").
193. Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004)
(joining "the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in holding that the term 'any action' in 29
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chance of an attorney's fee award being assessed against a plan administrator
remains slim.
B. Presuming the Harm: A Regulatory Solution to Claims Processing Non-
compliance
Consistent enforcement of ERISA's regulations calls for an approach akin to
that of consumer financial protections such as the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA).19 TILA's Regulation Z,195 for example, sets out requirements for
disclosure of consumer finance terms and provides penalties for non-compliance
regardless of actual harm. Similar enforcement of claims regulations under
ERISA would lend consistency to the enforcement process by providing a clear
incentive for administrators to comply with claims processing regulations.
A regulatory solution to the problem of claims processing begins by
recognizing that trust law requires supplementation in order to fulfill ERISA's
purpose: the provision of contracted benefits. At present, the struggle to find
essentially regulatory solutions within trust law is undermining the availability of
benefits. Lawsuits for non-compliance with claims processing regulations are
increasing in complexit as courts vainly sift through arcane trust law in a quest
for sensible solutions. 196 Instead, a consumer-oriented regulatory solution would
provide the clarity and predictability that those seeking healthcare should have.
1. Claims Processing Compliance Through a Presumed-Harm Approach
Akin to that of the Truth in Lending Laws
The DOL has issued additional language strengthening claims procedure
regulation.197 In order to be effective, though, the regulations must carry
significant, clear consequences for non-compliance. The enforcement provisions
of TILA and its Regulation Z exemplify the kind of provisions that could, if
adopted as part of ERISA's enforcement provisions and regulations, increase
compliance with claims processing regulations.
TILA concerns consumer credit, requiring certain disclosures from those
who extend credit.198 The law was written to address the concern that Americans
were uninformed in taking on debt and needed transparency regarding credit
terms.199 TILA's goal was to require disclosures of finance charges and related
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
195. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2010).
196. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (noting that ERISA is "an
enormously complex and detailed statute" and examining trust law at the time of the divided bench
to determine appropriate remedies in ERISA cases).
197. See discussion supra Section II.A.
198. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a); Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973).
199. Clement v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 206, 210 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting that
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information so that consumers could find the best terms available to them; TILA
also aimed to protect consumers against inaccurate credit billing.200
Although ERISA and TILA concern different subjects, these two laws have
much in common. Like ERISA, TILA was enacted to address a problem that
affected the finances of individuals. ERISA and TILA both regulate an area of
law that affects millions of consumer transactions. 201 Both statutes sought to
bring uniformity to their respective areas.202 Moreover, the legislative histories of
both ERISA and TILA show an overriding concern for communication and
clarity. 203
In the case of ERISA, as explained above, the initial concern was solvency
of pension plans; only later did it come to play a significant role in the regulation
of healthcare coverage.204 As a result, ERISA affects not just the finances but
also the health of millions of individuals. While both TILA and ERISA concern
matters that affect families' lives, TILA holds defendants to exacting standards
and enforcement requires no showing of individual harm-features that are
absent from the enforcement of ERISA's claims processing regulations.
Where enforcement is concerned, the two statutes and their regulations are
quite different.205 TILA contains specific statutory remedies for specific
disclosures required by TILA "are intended to provide, especially to the inexperienced and
uninformed consumer, a way to avoid 'the possibility of deception, misinformation, or at least an
obliviousness to the trust costs' of a credit transaction") (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Discount Co., 503 F. Supp. 246, 250 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
200. Cf Mourning, 411 U.S. at 363 (explaining that TILA was prompted by a finding that
consumers were "remarkably ignorant of the nature of their credit obligations").
201. Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure:
Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 199, 203
(2005) (noting that TILA applies to virtually every consumer credit transaction, including
mortgages, car loans, and credit card purchases).
202. Ian S. McCrea, Truth in Lending, A Discussion of Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v.
Bradley Nigh, 32 S.U. L. REV. 269, 269 (2005) (explaining that TILA sought to "provide economic
stabilization among credit lending institutions" and "create uniform regulations among the states").
203. Congress's purpose in enacting the ERISA disclosure provisions was partly to ensure that
"the individual participant knows exactly where he stands with respect to the plan . . . ." H. R. REP.
No. 93-533, at 11 (1973); see also 15 U.S.C. §1601(a) (2006) ("The informed use of credit results
from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the
various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit . . .
204. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 5, 281.
205. Edwards, supra note 201, at 212 ("Although Congress delegated rulemaking
responsibility for implementing TILA to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
enforcement authority for the Act was divided among nine Federal agencies, led by the Federal
Trade Commission"). With regard to ERISA, on the other hand, the Secretary of Labor has general
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violations.206 First, a TILA plaintiff has a cause of action to recover any actual
damage sustained by the plaintiff.207 Second, the plaintiff can recover statutory
damages of twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the
transaction, except that the award cannot be less than $100 or greater than
$1,000. 208 Third, a court has discretion to award statutory damages in the amount
of the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the defendant's net worth in a class
action.209 The statute also provides for criminal penalties for willful and knowing
210violations.
Significantly, the award of statutory damages results from the violation of
the statute, rather than any particular effect upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff need
not show any specific harm flowing from the non-compliance; lenders are
generally held strictly liable for inaccuracies, even if there is no showing that the
inaccuracies are misleading.211 In one case, for example, the plaintiffs did not
speak or read English and so could not have read the disclosures had they been
given. But statutory damages were awarded based on an objective evaluation of
the disclosures' compliance with the statute.212
While TILA imposes strict liability on lenders, it also contains a "bona fide
error" defense for technical mistakes or mistakes made despite "the maintenance
of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." 213 A defendant can
avoid liability by showing an error of calculation or omission occurred, and that
the defendant employed rocedures, such as accuracy reviews, to ensure that
mistakes were not made.
By most accounts, TILA is effective in encouraging regulatory compliance
and straightforward enforcement. Indeed, it has been called "a tremendous
success." The "modest automatic statutory penalty" described above is
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5). The Department of Treasury regulates ERISA plans claiming tax-exempt
status. Id. § 1202 (b).





211. Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., Inc., 195 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1999).
212. Zamarippa v. Cy's Car Sales, 674 F.2d 877, 879 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) (holding that where a
title transfer fee was included within the cash price of a vehicle rather than within the cost of credit
as required by TILA, statutory damages were appropriate "regardless of the district court's belief
that no actual damages resulted or that the violation is de minimus"); see also Sosa v. Fite, 498
F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1974).
213. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c).
214. Abel v. Knickerbocker Realty Co., 846 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D. Md. 1994) (declining to
apply bona fide error defense where lender's failure to include origination fee in finance charge
was accidental but no procedures were in place to ensure accuracy).
215. Russell v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co. (In re Russell), 72 B.R. 855, 862 (Bankr. E.D.
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particularly effective, one court notes, where "actual damages were perhaps non-
existent and [are], in any event, almost impossible to prove."216 As previously
described, the harm that results when administrators fail to comply with ERISA's
claims processing regulations is similarly difficult to prove, hard to quantify, and
in some individual cases non-existent.
Like TILA, ERISA contains statutory penalty provisions related to
healthcare claims. ERISA provides for a $110 per day penalty for each day
following the expiration of thirty days following a Participant's request for a
Summary Plan Description 217; ERISA also provides statutory penalties for failure
to provide appropriate COBRA notices.218 But with regard to disclosure of other
required information, such as the basis for a claim denial or the Participant's right
to appeal, the regulations do not provide any specific remedy. Given the
likelihood of Participant attrition during the appeal and litigation process, then,
the incentive is to skimp on communications that would focus Participants on
particular reasons for claim denials or that would provide Participants with
information about how advance their appeals. 219
If reforms were enacted such that certain violations of claims processing
regulations led to specific monetary penalties, all parties would have greater
certainty as to their expectations with regard to the claims processing procedures
and outcomes. The important concerns of uniformity and predictability-for
Participants, Payors, and their administrators-would equally be served by strict
liability for departures from the claims processing regulations. Participants
should be able to expect that the regulations applicable to healthcare claims are
followed-that, for example, a review intended to be "full and fair" and
completed within a certain period of time actually will be so.220
Pa. 1987); Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 11Ith Cong. 142 (2009) (statement of Travis
Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumers Union) ("Private enforcement is the norm and has
worked well as a complement to public enforcement in the vast majority of the consumer statutes
that will be consolidated under the CFPA, including TILA . . . . Conversely, the statutes that lack
private enforcement mechanisms are notable for the lack of compliance.").
216. 72 B.R. at 862.
217. 29 U.S.C. §l 132(c)(1)(A) (2006).
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1 1-268, PRIVATE HEALTH
INSURANCE: DATA ON APPLICATION AND COVERAGE DENIALS (2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dll268.pdf ("[D]enials are often coded for the most general reason
even though the denial may be for a more specific reason.").
220. Some aspects of the claims process are more susceptible to strict application of penalties
than others. For example, the presence or absence of required language in a notice to participants
would be more straightforward to assess than whether a plan administrator conducted the required
"full and fair" review. However, any lack of clarity in the standard for compliance suggests not that
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Uniformity and predictability are important to plan administrators and
Payors too, as liabilities are difficult to manage if plans are subject to a variety of
interpretations.221 The Court's solution to the problem of uniformity is for the
plan administrator's decision on claims to be given maximum deference, so that
Payors and their administrators can plan their affairs and not be subject to
varying interpretations of the plan by different federal courts.222 But given this
adherence to deferential review--even where the plan administrator's initial
interpretation of a plan is completely mistaken-accurate claims processing is
even more important. With penalties that would ensure a firm commitment to
claims processing regulations, administrators would be more likely to have
uniform claims processing procedures in place, and therefore to avoid inaccurate
claim denials. Similarly, on appeal, administrators would be more likely to
conduct the required full and fair review of denied claims, so that any improperly
denied claims could be granted administratively, instead of in litigation, in
keeping with ERISA's goals.223 Thus, clear monetary penalties for claims
procedure non-compliance would increase uniformity and predictability.
Set out below are the same examples of problematic health insurer practices
that are described in Section II.B above. Currently, these practices go all but
unremedied under ERISA. A reformed TILA-like regime would provide a
specific, monetary remedy for the following breaches of claims regulations, with
the same kind of bona fide error defense that TILA provides:
*Denying a claim incorrectly upon initial filing, then, if the
Participant appeals, paying the claim upon first-level internal
appeal. Under a more effective enforcement regime, the
administrator could be subject to a modest penalty, geared to the
dollar amount of the claim; as with TILA, administrators could
avoid the penalty completely through a "bona fide error" defense
which demonstrates that procedures are in place to avoid errors.
*Denying certain types of claims incorrectly upon initialfiling, then
paying them during litigation. Similar to the example above, the
administrator could be subject to a modest penalty, but increased
by a multiplier to reflect the Participant's additional time and
trouble, so that it is larger than the penalty for paying the claim
any risk of confusion or lack of clarity in the regulations falls on Participants, because Payors can
maneuver at will within any areas of uncertainty.
221. HEALTH, EDUC. & HUM. SERVS. Div., supra note 63, at 25 (noting that the Department of
Labor and others favor stronger remedies for non-compliance with the claims process, so that
"upstream" compliance is improved).
222. Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1650 (2010) (noting that the creation of ad hoc
exceptions to deferential review would cause uniformity problems in plan interpretation).
223. Id. at 1649 (noting that ERISA encourages claims to be handled at the administrative
level rather than through litigation).
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during internal appeal.
*Paying claims outside the regulatory deadlines. Prompt pay laws
enacted by fourteen state governments require interest plus
penalties to be paid on late claims.224 Federal laws should also
provide that administrators pay interest on improperly delayed
claims.
*Failing to communicate the basis for the claim denial or the
Participant's right to appeal. Without a clear understanding for
the basis of a denial or the manner in which to appeal, the
Participant lacks the tools to pursue contracted benefits. Here
too, the penalty could be geared to the dollar amount of the claim
at issue, with a bona fide error defense available.
A regulatory regime such as this would support ERISA's original goal of
ensuring contracted benefits. Congress intended ERISA to provide broad
remedies to redress violations and to remove procedural and jurisdictional
obstacles to enforcement.225 While ERISA was based on trust law, Congress also
saw fit to add statutory penalties where necessary to advance specific, important
goals.226 Congress imported trust law in order to provide an enforcement
framework and impose fiduciary duties on plan decision-makers, but Congress
predicted that the federal courts would develop a particular federal common law
that would suit ERISA's goals and purposes. Instead of a specialized federal
common law, however, current ERISA law has developed into an "unjust and
increasingly tangled ... regime" that often amounts to a "regulatory vacuum." 228
For this reason, many courts have called for ERISA reform; some urge the
Court to revisit its interpretation of equitable remedies available under ERISA. 229
But increasingly, courts and commentators argue that trust law-based on the
principles of fiduciary duty230 that are simply a fiction under ERISA-does not
224. Monica E. Nussbaum, Prompt Pay Statutes Should Be Interpreted To Grant Providers a
Private Right ofAction To Seek Enforcement Against Payors, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 205, 230 (2005)
(setting out and comparing fines and penalties contained in states' prompt pay laws).
225. S. REP. No. 93-127, (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4871.
226. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (2006) (setting out penalties for failing to meet certain disclosure
and notice requirements regarding COBRA, annual reports, summary plan descriptions, and other
notice provisions).
227. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 282 (discussing Senator Jacob Javits's concern over the
expansion of preemption and the absence of any replacement ERISA action).
228. See, e.g., Aetna Health v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222-23 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453, 457 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring)).
229. See id. at 223 (urging Congress or the Court to revisit the issue of the availability of
consequential damages against breaching fiduciaries).
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fit the goals of Congress when it enacted ERISA. The time for firm and precise
claims processing and enforcement reform has come.
Of course, no one would relish increased complexity in regulatory
compliance or enforcement. But if the compliance and enforcement experience of
the TILA is any indication, specific, direct penalties for non-compliance with
claims processing regulations should lead to increased compliance rather than
increased complexity. 31 Greater compliance favors Participants, but in many
ways advances the interests of Payors and their administrators as well.
2. A Separate Peace: Piecemeal and Inconsistent Private Reform Through
Provider Class Actions
In the absence of effective claims processing regulations, healthcare
providers are accomplishing a measure of private reform through class actions.232
These efforts only underscore the need for regulatory reform, however, because
the settlements vary from insurer to insurer, expire after a certain term, and are
geared to the parties that brought them, typically providers.
Healthcare providers have long battled health insurance companies over
improperly delayed and denied claims. Recently, however, providers have acted
through organizations such as the American Medical Association, suing health
insurance companies over their claims processing procedures. The complaints
have included claims of improper activities to reduce provider reimbursement,
including downcoding 233 and bundling, 234 as well as delays and improper
respect to the plan:
[S]olely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries ... with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with such matters would use
in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.
29 U.S.C. §1 104(a)(1).
231. See supra note 215.
232. The AMA's website sets out eleven different class action settlements and their terms.
Health Insurer Settlements, AM. MED. Ass'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/current-
topics-advocacy/private-sector-advocacy/health-insurer-settlements.page (last visited Mar. 27,
2011).
233. AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 20, at 23 ("Downcoding occurs when a health insurer
unilaterally reduces the level of complexity of a[] . . . service or procedure. . . . Health insurers
often base their payment on a lower valued (and lower complexity) . . . code instead of the higher
valued (and higher complexity) . .. code originally reported for payment.").
234. Id. at 19 ("Bundling occurs when a practice submits a claim for two or more separate,
distinct . . . procedures and services performed on a patient during a single visit. The health insurer
considers the two or more separate, distinct procedures and services as one and reimburses the
practice for only one procedure or service performed-often the one with the lowest
reimbursement-or reduces payment for the two or more procedures or services.").
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denials.235 These lawsuits, notably those consolidated as a Multi-District
Litigation lawsuit in Florida, have achieved settlement agreements that include
specific, measurable improvements to claims processing procedures.236
Settlements have included terms that increase transparency and predictability in
claims processing, such as the inclusion of specific, detailed definitions of certain
plan terms,237 interest payments for claims paid beyond deadlines, rohibitions
against specific actions with regard to billing codes, and other terms.
Reform through class action, however, is a poor substitute for broader
reform.239 First, Participants are not typically parties to these agreements.
Plaintiff classes of healthcare providers are certified more readily than classes of
Participants, due to the perceived individual facts and lack of uniform defendant
240actions surrounding the claims. The settlement agreements therefore carve out
special rules that do not include all ERISA stakeholders. When Participants are
not class members, the resulting agreements, while beneficial to Participants, are
geared to the providers' concerns.241 Second, only providers can enforce the
agreements' terms; Participants are left out.242 Third, the agreements vary from
235. See, e.g., Love v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, No. 03-21296-
CIV/MORENO/SIMONTON (S.D. Fla. 2007) (notice of proposed settlement of class action),
http://www.bcbsm.com/pdf/lovenotice.pdf ("The Complaint in this Action alleges that ... the Blue
Parties, among others, engaged in a conspiracy to improperly deny, delay, and/or reduce payments
to physicians.").
236. The Aetna settlement with all U.S. physicians, for example, included a settlement fund of
$100 million to be paid to physicians, a clear definition of "medical necessity," stricter deadlines
for paying claims and the payment of interest on late-paid claims, an independent appeal process
for physician disputes, and other terms. Christopher Guadagnino, MDs Weigh HMO Settlements,
PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIG. (Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.physiciansnews.com/2003/09/23/mds
-weigh-hmo-settlements.
237. Id.
238. Id. (noting that the provider class actions have brought about changes in reimbursement
practices that provider groups had previously sought-unsuccessfully-through legislative
channels and direct negotiation).
239. Id. (quoting American Medical Association President Donald J. Palmisano as stating that
reform through class action is a "last resort" and advocating more fundamental reform).
240. Compare Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming certification
of provider class alleging systematic underpayment of claims), with In re Managed Care Litig., 209
F.R.D. 678, 686 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (denying putative Participant class's motion for certification due
to lack of a uniform scheme directed at plaintiffs).
241. See, e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield Settlement Information, AM. MED. Ass'N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/amalpub/advocacy/current-topics-advocacy/private-sector-advocacy/
health-insurer-settlements/blue-cross-blue-shield.page (last visited June 23, 2010) (detailing
business practices such as automatic "downcoding" of certain billing codes that would no longer
occur under the settlement agreement's terms).
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lawsuit to lawsuit, so that no generally accepted standards emerge. Fourth, the
agreements do not result in enduring change because they expire after a certain
term of years.24 3
The class action settlement agreements do, however, show that a reform
movement is underway, but also that the results at present are uneven.
Consistent, inclusive, and effective reform must come from changes to ERISA
and its regulations, so that the rules are applicable to all.
CONCLUSION
When Participants and their advocates press for ERISA reform, employers
and health insurance companies often respond that employee benefits are purely
voluntary initiatives, and that if the provision of benefits is too onerous,
employers may simply decline to provide them.244 Even so, employee benefits
should not be confused with charity. Employees generally accept benefits in lieu
of additional compensation. In turn, employers are able to attract employees by
providing benefit packages and are able to receive favorable tax treatment in
order to do so. 24 And employees generally contribute to premium costs as
well.246 More importantly, however, the voluntary nature of the system does not
excuse the provision of illusory or unfair benefits. In any employer calculation of
the cost of benefits, employers should take into account that all regulations and
rules will be followed carefully.
The need for new remedies for improper processing of healthcare claims is
more pressing than ever. More than 177 million Americans receive health care
through their employers,247 and ERISA plans are now the vehicle for providing
the majority of healthcare coverage for those not eligible for Medicare. In
addition, increasing numbers of ERISA plans are self-insured,248 therefore
com/pages/highmark.html (last visited April 24, 2011) (describing procedures to dispute
compliance with settlement terms).
243. Health Insurer Settlements, supra note 232.
244. Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct., 1640, 1648 (2010) (noting that the provision of
employee benefits is purely voluntary); 29 C.F.R. § 2560 (noting the "purely voluntary nature of
the system"); HEALTH, EDUC. & HUM. SERVS. Div., supra note 63, at 16.
245. Mark W. Stanton, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Trends in Cost and Access,
U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., 2 (Sept. 2004), http://www.ahrq.gov/research/empsprial
empspria.pdf.
246. Id.
247. Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States: 2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 19 (Aug. 2008) http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs
/p60-235.pdf.
248. Self-insured plans are not considered insurance products and are therefore beyond the
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avoiding reform at the state level.249 Moreover, benefit denials are now almost
always reviewed under the generous abuse-of-discretion standard, and the
Supreme Court sees fewer and fewer circumstances in which this standard should
be lowered to de novo review.250
Whether increased penalties for regulatory violations could be developed by
the DOL or by Congress depends on the scope of reform. ERISA gives the DOL
authority to "prescribe such regulations as .. . necessary or ap ropriate to carry
out" the statutory provisions securing employee benefit rights. Thus, targeted,
additional regulations to strengthen claims processing could be viewed as
securing existing ERISA terms and mandates. If regulatory reform were to
broaden significantly the penalties for improper processing so as to change
fundamentally the remedies available under ERISA, the regulations might be
considered beyond the scope of the DOL's authority such that congressional
action would be needed to amend the underlying statute.252
The DOL regulations continue to evolve as a result of the PPACA.253 As the
regulations continue to be refined and strengthened, meaningful enforcement of
claims processing procedures should be a priority. The incentives to underpay or
deny claims still outweigh any consequence, even with the regulatory reforms
resulting from the PPACA. Correct, prompt claims processing should not be left
to chance or benevolence-direct, specific penalties should counterbalance the
financial pressures on health insurance companies and ensure the provision of
benefits as Congress intended.
249. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 284 (noting the "backlash" against ERISA's lack of remedies
and the increase in reform initiatives and noting that these reforms do not reach self-funded plans).
250. Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1650 (noting that the creation of ad hoc exceptions to deferential
review would cause uniformity problems in plan interpretation).
251. 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (2006); see also § 1133 (plans shall process claims "[i]n accordance
with regulations of the Secretary").
252. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute.").
253. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and
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